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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship  between technological  change 
and wages using pooled cross-sectional  industry-level data and several 
alternative  indicators  of the rate of introduction of new technology. 
Our main finding  is that industries  with a high rate of technical change 
pay higher  wages to workers of given  age and education, compared  to less 
technologically  advanced industries.  This is Consistent  with the notion 
that the introduction of new technology  creates a demand for learning, 
that learning is a function of employee  ability and effort,  and that 
increases  in wages are required to elicit  increases in ability and 
effort.  A related finding  is that the wages of highly educated workers 
(especially  recent graduates)  relative  to those of less educated  workers 
are highest in technologically  advanced industries;  this is consistent 
with the notion that educated workers are better learners. 
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New York,  NY  10027  New York,  NY  10027 I.  Introduction 
In a previous  paper (Bartel  and Lichtenberg  (1987))  we investigated 
the effect of technological  change  on the education  distribution  of 
employment.  We argued  that the successful  introduction  of new technology 
requires significant  learning  on the part of employees,  and hypothesized 
that highly  educated employees  enjoy a comparative  advantage  with respect 
to such on-the-job  learning.  This hypothesis  implied that  the "age" of a 
firm or  industry's  technology  enters  its cost-function  non-neutrally,  and 
that factor  cost shares  -- in particular,  highly-educated  labor's share 
in total cost -- should  be functions  of the age of technology.  Our 
empirical  results  were consistent  with this  hypothesis.  We found a 
significant  inverse relationship  at the industry  level  between the age of 
capital equipment 
-- a proxy for the age of technology  -— and  the  share 
of  highly  educated  workers  in  total  employment  or  labor  cost. 
In this  paper we examine the effect  of technological  change on the 
wage rate,  holding constant  employee education,  age,  and sex.  We postu- 
late that in order to satisfy the increased  demand  for learning  by 
workers following  the introduction  of new technology,  firms  will find it 
expedient  to pay higher  wages to employees  within given  education  and 
demographic  groups.  We test this hypothesis  by estimating  wage equations 
which include  indicators  of technical  change  on  pooled,  industry—level 
data. 
In the next section  we sketch  a theory  of technical  change  and 
learning  that implies  the existence of a link between  wages  and technr- 
- 
Cal  change.  In Section  III we briefly review  previous  theoretical  and 
empirical  research  concerning  the effect  of technological  change on 
wages.  Section IV describes  the econometric  model and data used to test 2 
our hypothesis.  Empirical results are presented and interpreted  in 
Section  V, and Section VI provides a summary  and concluding remarks. 
II.  Theoretical  Framework 
The replacement  or modification of an existing technology  by a new 
one represents  a major "shock" to the production environment,  and workers 
(and  perhaps management  as well) initially  are very uncertain as to how 
they should  modify their  behavior.  The transition  from old to new 
technology results in job  tasks  and operating  procedures  which are not 
only different  but, in the short run at least,  less well-defined.  Wells 
(1972,  pp.  8-9) has  argued,  in the context of the "product life-cycle" 
model, that in its infancy "the manufacturing  process is not broken down 
into simple tasks to the extent it will be later in the product's life." 
The introduction  of new technology  into a firm therefore  creates a need 
or demand for  learning  on the part of the firm's  employees. 
We postulate that the rate at which an employee learns  is a function 
of two variables:  his or her ability and effort.  Ability and effort are 
substitutes  in the production of learning.  As any teacher in a classroom 
setting knows,  highly gifted (able)  students  may not perform any better 
than less gifted ones,  if the  latter  work much harder. 
The introduction  of new technology,  since it necessitates learning, 
results in an increase in demand for employee ability and effort.  Both 
of these are scarce resources,  which therefore have positive (shadow) 
prices attached to them. 
As we have argued previously,  a worker's ability to learn is an 
increasing  function of his  or her education, so that technical change 
will increase the relative demand  for highly-educated  workers.  But even 
among workers with a given amount  of education, there is likely  to be 3 
considerable variance in ability.  Due to their high demand for learning, 
firms undergoing technical  change  will want to employ  the most talented 
people within education  groups,  as well as employing relatively  highly 
educated workers. 
Since learning is a function  of effort  as well as ability,  employers 
introducing  new technology  will also seek to elicit  high levels  of effort 
from workers.  We assume that  workers prefer  providing less  effort  to 
more effort, but tbat the firm can induce them to provide more effort  by 
paying higher wages.  There are two alternative  possible justifications 
for this:  compensating differentials,  and efficiency  wages.  These 
differ according to whether or not the level of employee effort  is 
costlessly  observable to the firm.  The compensating  differentials 
argument implicitly  assumes that the firm can monitor employee effort 
without cost,  and that to induce  workers to accept the greater disutility 
associated  with higher  effort,  it needs to pay higher  wages.  The effi- 
ciency  wage argument assumes that it is costly  for the  firm to monitor 
employee effort,  and therefore that employees  have the opportunity  to 
shirk,  but that their  propensity to shirk is inversely  related to the 
expected penalty of being detected a  shirker.  This expected penalty is 
the product of (a) the probability  of being detected (a function of the 
firm's expenditures  on monitoring  employees),  and (b) the penalty of 
being detected, assumed equal to the difference between the current wage 
and the opportunity  wage.  By paying a "wage  premium' -- a  wage in excess 
of the opportunity  wage -- the  firm can increase  the expected  penalty of 
being detected a shirker  and hence reduce  the extent of shirking. 
Whether or not effort is directly  or costlessly  observable  to the firm, 4 
then,  the firm can elicit greater effort  by paying higher  wages to 
workers of given  ability. 
To summarize  our argument, the introduction of new technology 
creates a denand for learning, and a combination  of employee ability and 
effort is required for learning to occur.  To some extent an increase in 
demand for ability can be satisfied  by hiring  more educated  workers, but 
even within education groups  workers are quite heterogeneous  with respect 
to ability.  Employers instituting  technical change  will tend to employ 
the most able individuals  with given amounts of education,  and will have 
to pay higher wages to do so.  Paying  higher wages  will also elicit 
higher levels  of employee effort,  which will contribute  further to the 
successful introduction  of new technology. 
The major implication  of our argument is that  workers in firms  or 
industries  experiencing rapid technical change  will tend to receive 
higher  wages than  workers with similar education and demographic  at- 
tributes in other firms or industries.  These  wage differences  are due to 
differences  in both unobserved ability and effort.  In our empirical work 
we test whether technology-related  wage differentials  exist,  but we 
cannot,  and do not attempt  to,  allocate these differentials  into ability- 
and effort—related  components. 
If this hypothesis  is correct, then it, in conjunction  with our 
earlier findings, suggests that "high—tech"  industries (industries 
experiencing rapid technical change)  are high wage industries for two 
distinct reasons,  which we may refer to as between—group and 
within-group.  Our earlier paper indicated  that the  introduction  of new 
technology  increases  the relative quantity of highly  educated workers, 
who of course tend to receive the highest  wages.  Technological change 5 
therefore  increases the average wage rate by increasing the employment 
share  of high-wage workers.  But the hypothesis  we have discussed implies 
that technological change  also increases  wages within education  groups, 
thus further raising the average  wage rate. 
A further issue is whether technology-related  differences  in the 
demand for learning should  result in differences  in the relative wage 
structure,  e.g.  the relative wages of different skill or occupational 
groups.  Most efficiency  wage theories do not address this issue  because 
they assume  there to be only a single type of labor.  But Dickens and 
Katz (1987)  have shown empirically  that industry  wage premia tend to be 
strongly  positively correlated  across occupations:  all workers in 
better-paid industries  tend to receive  high wage premia.  Akerlof and 
Yellen (1988)  have constructed  a theoretical  model based on sociological 
equity and social exchange theories  which may account for this finding. 
They postulate two types of labor,  and that  work effort is inversely 
related to the (between-group)  variance of the wage distribution,  on the 
grounds that "firms  with less variance in their compensation  will have 
more harmonious labor relations  and thus achieve higher output  per 
worker."  (p.  45).  Their theory  implies that differential demand for 
effort would have little  or no effect on relative  wages; equity consider- 
ations would force managers in industries  requiring substantial  learning 
and effort to raise all wages  more or less proportionately. 
In sharp contrast,  the model developed  by Lazear (1981) implies that 
in the presence of costly  monitoring increased  demand for effort results 
in a steeper age—earnings  profile but not necessarily  in a higher  present 
discounted  value of earnings over the  life  cycle.  According to Lazear's 
model, to induce employees  not to shirk,  the employer need pay them wage 6 
premia only towards the end of their careers,  not throughout  their 
careers.  Indeed, the optimal wage policy is one of deferred 
compensation:  young workers tend to be paid less than the value 
of their  marginal product, old workers  more.  If,  as we have postulated, 
industries  experiencing rapid technical  change have higher demand for 
effort,  then the Lazear model suggests that these industries  would 
exhibit steeper age—earnings  profiles than other industries.  The 
high—tech  wage premium would be higher for older  workers than it would be 
for younger workers; indeed,  the premium for younger workers might even 
be negative. 
The Lazear model is not the only model that suggests that the slope 
of an industry's  age-earnings profile might  be related to its rate of 
technical change.  Such a relationship  may also be implied by the theory 
of on—the—job  training (, branch of human capital theory).  The theory  of 
on-the-job  training (OJT)  was originally  developed to explain why indi- 
viduals' earnings tended  to increase until late in their careers.  This 
theory  postulates that,  early in a worker's career,  his  own time and other 
resources  are invested to develop skills  which will increase his  future 
productivity.  The upward slope  of the age—earnings  profile is inter- 
preted to reflect the positive relationship  between job tenure and 
productivity resulting from  OJT investment.  The greater the intensity  of 
training,  the steeper the profile.  Several investigators  have hypothe- 
sized that  workers and firms in industries  experiencing rapid technical 
change  tend to invest relatively  heavily in on-the-job  training.  Mincer 
and Higuchi (1988) postulated that "rapid technical change  which induces 
greater and continuous training,  is in part responsible for steeper 
profiles."  Similarly, Tan suggested  that "skill acquisition is greater 7 
in more technologically  progressive firms."  (p.3)  In fact,  he cites 
direct  evidence that "higher rates of technical change are associated 
with increased reliance on in-house company training, and a lower proba- 
bility  of training from outside sources  such as academic institutions, 
business and technical schools." (p.2).  He therefore hypothesizes that 
"starting  wages are lower, and subsequent  rates  of wage growth with 
tenure  are higher, the more rapid  the rate of growth in total factor 
productivity," (p.  12) a proxy for technological change. 
Even if the intensity of investment  in OJT is greater in industries 
experiencing rapid technical  change, due to the possibility of skill 
obsolescence it is not clear  that such industries  should exhibit steeper 
age-earnings  profiles.  The introduction  of new technology  might be 
expected to reduce the  current capital  value of older  workers' past 
training investments, hence their  wage rate relative to that of younger 
workers. 
1 
In addition to influencing  the age-structure  of earnings, an indus- 
try's rate of technical change could  also affect the education-strrn*ure 
of earnings.  Our previous paper indicated  that the ratio of 
highly-educated  to less educated employment  tends  to be highest in 
industries  using relatively  new capital  equipment.  If the supply  of 
labor to particular  industries  were less than perfectly elastic, then one 
would expect the ratio of highly-educated  to less  educated  wage rates to 
also be higher in these industries.  The effect  of technical  change on 
this ratio, which- might  be interpreted  as the "returns to education," 
1Tan acknowledges that "no  account  is taken of the possible 
consequences  of rapid technical  change for the rate of skill deprecia- 
tion" (p.  8) in his theoretical  model. 8 
could differ across  age groups if education were subject to "vintage 
effects."  If recently-acquired  education confers  a greater ability to 
adapt to changing technology  than education acquired long ago, then one 
might expect  technical change to increase  the returns to education to 
young workers more than it would to older workers.  We can investigate 
this  possibility by estimating  the effect  of technology indicators  on 
wage rates cross—classified  by age and education. 
This concludes our brief survey  of theories and hypotheses suggest- 
ing the existence of a link between the level and/or structure  of an 
industry's  wages and its  rate  of introduction of new technology.  In the 
next section we briefly summarize  the limited previous empirical  evidence 
concerning  such a link. 
III.  Literature  Review 
Dickens and Katz (1987)  analyzed  the relationship  between wage rates 
and the industry's ratio  of research  and development  (R&D)  expenditure  to 
sales -— controlling  for a large  number of other industry and worker 
characteristics  —- using data from the  1983  Current Population  Survey. 
Numerous studies (see,  e.g.  Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984))  have shown 
that R&D—intensity is a significant  determinant  of an industry's  rate of 
total-factor-productivity  (TFP)  growth,  a proxy for its  rate of technical 
change.  Dickens and Katz found that R&D-intensity  was positively  related 
to wages in the nonunion sector (the correlations  were significant  about 
half the time),  but that this result  was  reversed in the union sector, 
where most specifications  had a negative coefficient  which  was sometimes 
significant.  Their evidence suggests that the union wage premium is 
lower -- perhaps  even negative -- in -R&D-intensive  industries,  but the 
effect  of R&D-intensity on the overall (average)  wage is unclear. 9 
Tan also used Current Population Survey  data (for  both 1983 and 
1984)  to study  the effect of technical change  on wages,  but his measures 
of technical  change  were industry-level  estimates of total factor  produc- 
tivity growth constructed  by Gollop and Jorgenson.  His major findings 
were that starting wages (wages  of young  workers) were lower, and wage 
growth  with job tenure  higher, the higher the industry's rate of produc- 
tivity growth  during 1973-79.  Thus,  consistent  with the Lazear and Ofl 
models,  the age-earnings  profile is steeper in industries  experiencing 
rapid technical change.  Tan's estimates  implied that at the sample mean 
value of job tenure,  TIP growth  has a positive net effect on wages; on 
average, then,  wage levels  are higher  in high TIP-growth sectors.  Tan 
also experimented  with interactions  between technical change and schooL- 
ing but found these  to be statistically  insignificant. 
Mincer and Higuchi's study focused on differences  between the U.S. 
and Japan with respect  to earnings  profiles and turnover rates.  They 
used data from the 1979 Japanese Employment  Structure Survey and  from the 
U.S. Panel  Study of Income  Dynamics for the period 1976—81,  in conjunc- 
tion with TIP indices for (roughly  2-digit)  U.S. and Japanese industries 
constructed  by Conrad and Jorgenson.  Their evidence confirms  Tan's 
finding that high-TIP-growth  industries  exhibit steeper age-earnings 
profiles than low—TIP—growth  industries.  (The  equations they estimated 
do not reveal  the effect  of TIP growth  on starting  wages or on the 
overall level of wages in the industry.)  Age—earnings profiles in Japan 
tend to be much steeper than those in the U.S., and their estimates imply 
that as much as 80 percent of the difference  in slopes  may be accounted 
for by Japan's much higher recent rate of productivity  growth. 10 
In the next section we re-examine  the relationship  between 
technological change  and wages, using a completely  new data set which 
includes several alternative  indicators  of the rate of introduction of 
new technology. 
IV.  Econometric Specification 
We have described several hypotheses  that predict a positive rela- 
tionship  between technological change  and wages and, in some cases, a 
change  in the slope of the age-earnings  profile, and an increase in the 
returns to education.  In this section of the paper, we describe the 
wage equation and data that  will be used to test those  hypotheses. 
Our database consists of a sample  of 35 manufacturing industries 
observed in the three Census  years, 1960,  1970 and 1980.  From the 
Censuses of Population,  we selected individuals  who were employed in each 
of these industries  and created seventy age by education  by sex cells for 
each industry.  Our unit of observation  is one of these  cells,  resulting 
in approximately  2400 observations in each of the three  years.  The 
dependent variable is the mean wage rate of the  individuals  in the cell. 
This specification  assumes that age,  education  and sex are good proxies 
for the individual's stock  of human capital. 
For each of our 35 industries,  we have obtained three  indicators  of 
technological change.  The  first  is the age of the industry's equipment 
(AGEEQ)  which is calculated  from the Bureau of Industrial  Economics' 
Capital Stocks  Data Base.  If one accepts the notion of embodied tech- 
nological change,  then the age of the capital stock is a perfect measure 
of the age of the industry's  technology.  Even if technological  change 
is not completely  embodied, there  will be a strong  relationship  between 
the age of the capital stock  and the age of the technology  for two 11 
reasons.  First, the introduction  of new technology  increases equili- 
brium industry output,  leading to a higher rate of investment and a 
younger capital stock.  Second, according  to the product life cycle 
approach, once a stable  production technique is established, intense 
capital investment  occurs, thereby  producing a correlation  between age 
of the capital stock  and age of the technology  in a cross section of 
industries..  The second technology  variable that we use is the ratio of 
the industry's  purchases of electronic and computing equipment  divided 
by the industry's output (COMPUTERS). This measure is obtained from 
the input-Output  Tables.  The third  variable is the ratio of the indus- 
try's own  R&D  expenditures to its  sales  (OWNRD)  which is obtained from 
the technology  matrix constructed  by Scherer (1984).  While information 
on AGEEQ and COMPUTERS is available for each of the three time periods 
in our analysis, OWNR.D  can only  be measured for one time period (1974), 
thus making this variable a less reliable indicator. 
The following industrial  characteristics  are also included in the 
wage equation: (1) UNION, the percentage of employees in the industry 
that are unionized,  obtained from Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985);  (2) 
AGEPL, the average age of plant in the industry,  obtained from the Bureau 
of Industrial  Economics'  Capital Stocks Data Base;  (3) CAPLAB,  the 
capital/labor ratio  in the industry,  and (4) GROWTH, the growth rate in 
the industry's output  over the  last decade.  The latter two variables are 
calculated from the Census/SRI/Penn  Data Base which is derived primarily 
from the Annual Survey of Manufactures  and the Census  of Manufactures. 
The equation that  we estimate is: 
mW..  a  +a AGE+a  EDUC+a SEX+a  TEJd+0  TECH  lJt  o  1  2  3  4  5 
+a UNION+a  AGEPL+o  CAPLAB+a  GROWTH+Ô  +e..  (1)  6  7  8  9  t  1Jt 12 
where W.. 
= the  average  wage of individuals  in the th  age by education 
by sex cell in the jth industry in year t 
AGE  = a vector describing  the seven age categories 
EDUC = a  vector describing  the five education categories 
SEX  = male or female 
YEAR = 1960,  1970 or 1980 
TECH  AGEEQ, COMPUTERS  or OWNRD 
= a  set of time dummies used to control for the effects of 
changes over time in unmeasured  determinants that are 
common to all industries. 
We also estimate a  'fixed effects" variant of equation (1) where we 
add industry  dummies  to control for the effects of any permanent dif- 
ferences across industries  in unmeasured determinants  of wages.  Within 
this framework,  the coefficients on the  independent  variables in equa- 
tion (1) capture the partial relationships  between deviations of these 
variables from their respective  industry means  and deviations of 9n W. 
from its respective industry  mean.  A  heuristic interpretation  of this 
estimation  procedure is that it reveals  whether an industry that experi- 
enced an increase in AGEEQ above the average experienced  by all indus- 
tries between, say,  1960 and 1970,  had a significantly  below-average 
increase in £n W.  during that period. 
V.  Empirical Ana1ysi 
The  results  of estimating  equation (1) without and with fixed 
effects are shown in Tables 1  and 2,  respectively.  Note that in 
Table 2, OWNRD has been excluded  because we only have information  on 
that variable for one time period.  We begin  with the results in Table 1 
where in columns (1) through (3) each technology indicator is used 13 
Table 1 
Dependent Variable:  Ln (Average  Wage in Age  By Education By 
Sex Cell in an Industry) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Without Fixed Effects 
Independent  (lj  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Variable 
AGEEQ  -  .051  -  .022  —  .022 
(—16.04)  (—5.28)  (—5.27) 
OWN.RD  .101  .075  .058 
(17.07)  (10.43)  (4.94) 
COMPUTERS  3.19  1.93  2.24 
(13.55)  (7.47)  (8.04) 
AGEPL  .004  .007 
(2.40)  (4.16) 
UNION  .336  .386  .388  .399  .412 
(24.13)  (27.06)  (26.65)  (26.49)  (26.63) 
CAPLAB  —.013 
(— .38) 
GROWTH  .971 
(6.90) 
R2  .986  .986  .986  .987  .987 
N  7284  7106  7227  7106  7106 
Note:  All equations  include  age,  education,  sex  and year vectors which 
are in all cases statistically significant. 14 
Table 2 
Dependent Variable:  Ln (Average  Wage in Age By Education By 
Sex Cell in an Industry) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
With Fixed Effects 
AGEEQ  -  .017  -  .018 
(—3.54)  .  (—3.67) 
COMPUTERS  -1.68  -1.166 
(—1.04)  (—.71) 
AGEPL  .004 
(1.79) 
UNION  .350  .360  .387 
(5,70)  (5.87)  (5.23) 
CAPLAB  .001 
(1.14) 
GROWTH  - .025 
(-.15) 
R2  .920  .920  .921 
N  7284  7227  7227 
Note:  All equations  include age, education, sex, year and industry 
vectors that are in all cases statistically significant. 15 
separately and only the sex,  age, education  and union  variables are 
included.2  All three technology  measures have the right signs  and are 
significant.  Individuals  in industries  with new equipment,  high R&D 
to  sales ratios,  or a large share of computer  purchases relative to 
the value of output, are paid higher  wages than observationally  equi- 
valent individuals  in other industries.  In column (4)  all three tech- 
nology variables,  as well as AGEPL,  are used together and each is still 
significant.  These results are consistent  with the demand for  learning 
model discussed in Section  II; workers in industries  experiencing rapid 
technical change  receive higher  wages than workers with similar educa- 
tion and demographic  attributes in other industries  because of differ- 
ences in both unobserved  ability and effort. 
It is possible that our technology  variables are highly correlated 
with the capital/labor ratio and the growth rate of output in the  indus- 
try,  two other  possible determinants of wages.  These two variables are 
added in column (5),  and, remarkably,  all three of our technology  varia- 
bles are still significant.  CAPLAB  has  the wrong sign in column (5) but 
was positive and very significant  when the  technology  variables  were 
excluded.  Previous studies that report a positive effect of CAPLAB on 
wages  may therefore have obtained a spurious result that is due to the 
positive correlation  between the  capital/labor  ratio  and the rate of 
technological  change in the industry.  Our analysis implies that it is 
technological change, not the capital/labor  ratio, that determines the 
wage premium. 
2For the sake of brevity, the  coefficients  on sex, age,  education 
and year are not shown in the table.  The standard findings  were obtained 16 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating  equation (1) with fixed 
effects.  Although the coefficient  on AGEEQ declines about 213  in magni- 
tude,  it remains negative and significant,  consistent  with our hypothesis 
that the introduction  of new technology  increases the demand  for learn- 
ing.  COMPUTERS, however, is no longer significant.  Hence,  AGEEQ appears 
to be the strongest  indicator of technological  change. 
The analysis so far has assumed that the impact  of technological 
change on wages is the same for all workers in the  industry.  We dis- 
cussed in Section II how and why technological change  might have differ- 
ent impacts on highly educated vs.  less educated, and young vs.  older 
workers.  We now allow for unequal effects of technological change  on 
different demographic  groups by creating interaction  variables between 
the technology  measure and several age by education categories.  The age 
categories are (1) ages 18-34 and (2) ages 35-64, and the education 
categories  are (1) less than college graduate and (2) at least a college 
graduate.  Tables 3  and 4 report  these results from  equations estimated 
without and with fixed  effects, respectively.  In these tables, we show 
the effects of technological change  on the two age groups,  the two 
education groups and the four age by education groups.  The variables 
included in the equations are UNION, CAPLAB,  GROSQTH, AGE, SEX,  EDUC,  and 
YEAR.  GROWTH is also interacted  with age,  education or both, depending 
on the interaction  structure that is used for  the technology  variable. 
This means that if we do observe an impact  of technological change  on the 
in all of our equations.  Men earn more than women and earnings rise with 
age and with education. 17 
Table 3 
Wage Effects  By Age  and Education, 
from Equations  without  Fixed Effects 
A.  AGEEQ 
Total  Educ  15  Educ  1 
Total  -  .041  —  .038  —  .056 
(—12.19)  (-10.62)  (-6.67) 
Ages  18-34  —  .032  -  .028  -  .066 
(-6.19)  (-5.45)  (-7.02) 
Ages 35-64  —  .046  -  .044  -  .053 
(-11.10)  (-10.19)  (-6.05) 
B.  COMPUTERS 
Total  Educ  15  Educ  16 
Total  3.31  3.20  3.78 
(14.25)  (12.54)  (7.25) 
Ages  18—34  3.24  3.17  4.14 
(9.35)  (8.28)  (5.51) 
Ages 35—64  3.37  3.23  3.77 
(11.15)  (9.85)  (5.35) 
C.  OWNRD 
Total  Educ  15  Educ  16 
Total  .119  .119  .117 
(12.28)  (11.85)  (6.17) 
Ages  18-34  .123  .123  .141 
(9.83)  (9.40)  (5.05) 
Ages  35-64  .118  .118  .106 
(10.67)  (10.35)  (4.50) 
Note:  The  age, education,  sex and year vectors  as well as UNION and 
CAPLAB  are included  in these equations.  In addition,  age-education 
interaction  effects  on GROQTh are used which correspond  to the 
interaction  effects  on the technology  variable. 18 
Table 4 
Wage Effects By Age and Education, 
from Equations  with  Fixed Effects 
A.  AGEEQ 
Total  Educ  15  Educ  16 
Total  -  .016  -  .014  -  .029 
(-3.38)  (-2.90)  (-3.33) 
Ages  18-34  -  .005  -  .002  -  .037 
(—.89)  (—.46)  (-393) 
Ages  35-64  -  .023  -  .021  -  .026 
(-4.30)  (-3.93)  (-2.94) 
B.  C01PUTERS 
Total  Educ  15  Educ  16 
Total  -1.52  -1.32  -.61 
.92)  (—  .80)  (—  .34) 
Ages  18-34  —1.64  -1.41  -.26 
(—.98)  (—.85)  (—.  15) 
Ages  35-64  -1.48  -1.31  -.66 
(-  .89)  (—.80)  (—  .37) 
Note:  The  age, education,  sex and year  vectors  as well as UNION and 
CAPLAB  are included  in these equations.  In addition,  age-education 
interaction  effects on GROWTh  are used  which correspond  to the 
interaction  effects on the technology variable. 19 
structure  of wages in the industry, it cannot  be attributed  to a possible 
correlation  between technological  change  and output growth. 
In panel A  of Table 3, the effect  of technological change  on rela- 
tive  wages is estimated  with AGEEQ as the technology indicator.  We see 
that all workers in industries  with new technology  have higher wages, 
ceteris paribus.  Although all employed workers benefit from the intro- 
duction of new technology in their industries,  we do see that some 
workers gain more than others.  In particular,  the wages of college 
graduates increase  more than those of the less educated employees,  but 
this difference is not significant  when older workers are compared.  The 
increase in the relative  wage of college graduates,  especially  younger 
ones,  is consistent  with the comparative  advantage  theory  proposed in 
our earlier  paper.  As new technology  is introduced,  there is an in- 
crease in the  relative  demand for highly educated individuals (especial- 
ly those whose education is recently  acquired).  Wages rise if the 
supply of labor  to particular industries  is less than perfectly elastic. 
Regarding the impact of technological  change  on the age earnings 
profile, the results in panel A are ambiguous.  We find that the profile 
is steeper  when we do not disaggregate  by education,  and,  after dis- 
aggregating, only for the less-educated  workers in the technologically 
advanced industries.3  The fact that this does not hold for the college 
31t might  be argued that the steeper age-earnings  profiles in high-tec 
industries result  from the negative correlation  between innovation and 
percent unionized in the industry.  Connolly at al.  (1986)  and Hirsch  and 
Link (1987)  have documented  this negative relationship.  We tested for 
this by adding  an interaction  term between UNION and AGE, and found that 
the AGEEQ—AGE interaction  was unaffected;  age—earnings  profiles are 
steeper in industries  introducing  new technology. 20 
graduates casts doubt on the validity of the specific—training  hypothesis 
-— at  least the one not allowing for skill obsolescence.  If the introduc- 
tion of new technology results  in greater investments  in the specific 
human capital of employees,  we should  have seen this effect  most strongly 
for the highly-educated  workers, given the positive correlation  between 
education and training that has been observed in other studies.  One 
possible explanation  is that skill  obsolescence  is much stronger  for the 
college graduates;  thus,  technological  change reduces the'wages  of older 
college graduates relative  to that of younger graduates.  Finally, the 
results could  be consistent  with the Lazear model of deferred compensa- 
tion if employers  find it more difficult  to monitor the shirking of less 
educated workers.  We find this assumption rather implausible  since the 
less educated  workers are more likely  to be performing repetitive  tasks 
that are easily  monitored. 
In panel B, we use COUTERS as our technology  indicator.  The 
results here are basically consistent  with those in panel  A.  All workers 
in industries  with large computer  purchases  have higher  wages and the 
relative wage of college graduates  in both age groups rises.  There is no 
support for the specific training  hypothesis or the Lazear  model since 
neither of the two age-earnings  profiles  becomes steeper.  In panel C, 
the R&D variable is used to measure technological  change.  Again, all 
four groups  have higher  wages in industries  with high R&D to sales 
ratios.  The relative wage of college graduates in the young age group 
rises  and there is no evidenc that age—earnings  profiles become 
steeper. 
Finally, in Table 4, the relative  wage results  are presented from 
equations  with fixed  effects.  The findings  are virtually identical  to 21 
those reported in Table 3.  The introduction  of new technology leads  to 
an increase in the relative wage of college graduates,  an increase in 
the relative wage of older workers when we do not disaggregate by educa- 
tion,  and an increase in the slope of the age-earnings  profile for the 
less-educated  workers. 
VI.  Conclusions 
This paper examined the  relationship  between technological change 
and wages using  pooled cross—sectional  industry-level  data and several 
alternative  indicators  of the rate of introduction  of new technology. 
Our main finding  is that industries  with a high rate of technical change 
pay higher  wages to workers of given  age and education,  compared to less 
technologically  advanced industries.  We have argued that this is consis- 
tent with the notion that the introduction  of new technology  creates a 
demand for learning,  and a combination  of employee ability and effort  is 
required for learning to occur.  A related finding  is that the wages of 
highly educated  workers (especially  recent  graduates) rise relative to 
those of less  educated  workers; this is consistent  with the notion that 
educated workers are better learners. 
The evidence presented in this  paper is important for the following 
reasons.  First, our results suggest that observed industry  wage differen 
tIals can,  indeed,  be market—clearing.  Industries  that have a greater 
need for employees  who are good learners  will pay higher  wages, in 
equilibrium, than industries less  dependent on worker learning.  Some 
researchers  have argued that the existence of persistent industry wage 
differentials is proof of market failure.  But the fact that these 
differentials are correlated  with industry rates  of technical change 
suggests that they are not a consequence  of market imperfections,  but 22 
instead reflect differential  demand for ability and effort.  A second 
implication  of our results is that the continued growth  of the high-tech- 
nology sector in the United States  will require  a steady  supply of 
workers who are good learners.  This supply  can be influenced  by govern- 
ment education  policies that will teach students  to be better learners as 
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